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LOCAL BUDGETS, LOCAL DECISIONS: THE HOME
RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROJECT’S STATE
SUPPORT FOR LOCAL DEMOCRACY PROVISIONS*
ERIN ADELE SCHARFF**
As scholars of local government have long noted, without adequate local
revenue, home rule provides hollow legal authority. Recognizing the importance
of local revenue, the National League of Cities’ Principles of Home Rule for
the 21st Century (“Principles”) explicitly includes taxation as a power
granted by home rule and articulates a constitutional commitment to adequate
intergovernmental aid. To further strengthen local budgetary control, the model
bans unfunded mandates and incorporates an anti-coercion principle that
requires conditions on state aid relate to the purposes of such aid.
Together, the anti-coercion and unfunded mandate provisions limit state
lawmakers’ ability to indirectly limit home-rule authority through state purse
strings. This Article applies these provisions to three recent examples of state
efforts to tie local fiscal support and taxing authority to substantive state policy
goals. In doing so, the Article highlights the ways the Principles might
strengthen local democracy and also explores the challenge local governments
face when confronting state legislatures with oppositional policy preferences.
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INTRODUCTION

Fiscal year 2020 promised another year of record economic growth, which
would generate natural revenue growth for local governments.1 Instead, local
governments spent much of 2020 addressing record revenue shortfalls due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. As Cincinnati Mayor John Cranley worried in the
summer of 2020: “There’s no way Cincinnati or Columbus or any city can
survive or thrive if local governments suffer the catastrophic loss of revenue
that we are projecting right now.”2
As winter approached, it became clear that many state budgets would
weather the pandemic far better than initially expected.3 The same, however,
1. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE AUDITORS, COMPTROLLERS & TREASURERS, STATE AND
LOCAL FISCAL FACTS – 2020, at 1 (2020), http://www.nasact.org/files/News_and_Publications/White
_Papers_Reports/2020_State_and_Local_Fiscal_Facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFJ9-TYPL] (“Before
the COVID-19 crisis, state fiscal conditions were strong following a decade of revenue growth and
bolstering reserves.”).
2. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS 2020, at 7 (2020), https://www.nlc.
org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/City_Fiscal_Conditions_2020_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC7P
-PJBK].
3. See Barb Rosewicz, Mike Maciag & Alexandre Fall, States Forecast Wide-Ranging Effects on
Revenue Since the Pandemic’s Start, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.
org/en/research-and-analysis/article/2021/03/31/states-forecast-wide-ranging-effects-on-revenue-since
-the-pandemics-start [https://perma.cc/6S5Z-QYJA] (explaining that more recent state revenue
forecasts are more optimistic than those issued earlier in the pandemic). State revenue projections
exceeded initial forecasts for several reasons. Among the most important, most professional workers
continued working—and receiving paychecks—throughout the pandemic, and both employment and
the stock market recovered more quickly than anticipated. Id. As a result, states with income taxes,
especially states with progressive income taxes, did not experience significant declines in income tax
revenue. See LUCY DADAYAN & KIM RUEBEN, TAX POL’Y CTR., SURVEYING STATE LEADERS ON
THE STATE OF STATE TAXES 2 (2021), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/surveyingstate-leaders-state-state-taxes/full [https://perma.cc/Q4VV-2BLC]. Further, federal aid and especially
extended unemployment relief meant consumer spending did not fall by nearly as much as initially
predicted. See Rosewicz et al., supra. Moreover, shutdown orders shifted consumer consumption away
from services—which are generally not subject to state sales taxes—and toward the taxable purchase of
tangible property. See Danielle Moran, Wayfair Sales Tax Case Sparked a Pandemic Windfall for States,
BLOOMBERG TAX (Mar. 5, 2021), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/wayfair-sales-taxcase-sparked-a-pandemic-windfall-for-states [https://perma.cc/HVN8-YDE5 (dark archive)]. For
example, if you bought hair scissors to give yourself a haircut, you likely paid sales tax on the scissors;
you would not have paid sales tax on the haircut that you would have otherwise gotten in a salon. Most
states had already moved to tax online sales after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wayfair and
were therefore in a good position to benefit from these changing consumption patterns. Id.
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could not be said of local budgets. Fearful that state-level budget projections
would reduce pressure to provide federal aid to struggling cities, local leaders
continued to highlight their cities’ significant budget challenges.4
These efforts succeeded. In March 2021, the federal American Rescue Plan
Act (“ARPA”)5 provided an unprecedented fiscal relief package for local
governments.6 ARPA provided $130 billion in aid to local governments to be
distributed by formula.7 While Congress required local governments to use the
money to address fiscal and health issues arising from the pandemic,8 the statute
and subsequent Treasury guidance have given local governments significant
latitude in how to use these funds.9 Local governments can use the federal aid
to offset pandemic-driven revenue losses.10 In addition, ARPA allocated
hundreds of billions more for program-specific aid in areas like education,
transportation, infrastructure, and housing that will provide additional funding
for local governments.11 As a result of this new aid, local officials faced a pressing
new problem: how to wisely spend this new infusion of federal dollars.12
In some sense, then, it is an odd time to be thinking about the adequacy
of local revenue. Federal aid has temporarily limited immediate fiscal concerns
and offered an opportunity for many local governments to make strategic
investments in local communities. The ARPA, however, is not a solution to the

4. Alyssa Fowers & Rachel Siegel, Why Some State and Local Governments Are Desperate for More
Stimulus Aid, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/02/15/
biden-stimulus-state-local-aid/ [https://perma.cc/A6QB-AP8V (dark archive)].
5. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
6. See, e.g., American Rescue Plan: Strategies for Local Leaders, BROOKINGS INST. (2021), https://
www.brookings.edu/interactives/american-rescue-plan-strategies-for-local-leaders/ [https://perma.cc/
4NBV-QBXN] (providing recommendations for how to spend the money).
7. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, § 603, 135 Stat. at 228 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 803(b)(1)(B)).
8. ARPA Local Relief Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (2021), https://
www.nlc.org/covid-19-pandemic-response/american-rescue-plan-act/arpa-local-relief-frequentlyasked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/Z3QZ-GSMT] [hereinafter ARPA Local Relief FAQ].
9. Id.; see also American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, § 603, 135 Stat. at 231–32 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 803(c)(1)); Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, 31 C.F.R. §§ 35.1–.12
(2021).
10. ARPA Local Relief FAQ, supra note 8; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, § 603, 135 Stat. at
232 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 803(c)(1)(C)).
11. See American Rescue Plan of 2021, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 10, 2021), https://
www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/american-rescue-plan-act-of-2021.aspx [https://
perma.cc/GC8Y-D2GV] (summarizing ARPA funding by program source).
12. See, e.g., Brad Whitehead, Isaac Velez & Eli Byerly-Duke, The American Rescue Plan
Opportunity Is Knocking for Local Governments. Will They Answer?, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-american-rescue-plan-opportunity-is-knocking-for-localgovernments-will-they-answer/ [https://perma.cc/K55W-TY46] (“For many, an improved economic
outlook changes the desired impact of [the American Rescue Plan] local recovery funds from pure relief
to broader economic and social change.”).
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long-term challenges confronting local governments; policy crafted for a oncein-a-generation crisis is a poor building block for local revenue resiliency.
Once ARPA dollars are gone, local governments will return to the statusquo ante: limited and eroding fiscal authority. Local governments have limited
taxing authority under most states’ constitutional home-rule provisions,13 and
as scholars have lamented, the adoption of tax and expenditure limits greatly
reduce local control over property tax revenue.14 As a result, local governments
often lack the legal authority to raise revenue when needed to close budget gaps.
Meaningful local democracy requires adequate local revenues. Without
adequate revenue, even robust initiative authority and strong home-rule
immunity leave local governments with empty legal authority.15 The Principles
of Home Rule for the 21st Century (“Principles”), an initiative of the National
League of Cities, offers a new vision of local fiscal authority, explicitly including
taxation as a power granted by home rule16 and articulating a constitutional
commitment to adequate intergovernmental aid.17
Moreover, recognizing that state mandates limit local budget discretion,
the model articulated by the Principles also includes a ban on unfunded
mandates: “The state shall not require local governments to provide additional
services or undertake new activities without providing an additional
appropriation that fully funds the newly mandated service or activity.”18
In addition to addressing these more general and long-standing challenges
of local revenue sufficiency, the Principles also seeks to address a newer problem:
punitive preemption. As the introduction to the Principles discusses, states have
increasingly sought to use limited local authority as a tool of regulatory
preemption. Punitive preemption imposes fiscal penalties on local governments
and sometimes on local officials, who adopt policies inconsistent with state law
or state policy objectives.19 Recognizing that state aid could also be used as a
13. See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What To Do
About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 295–97 (2016) [hereinafter Scharff, Powerful Cities?] (describing
limitations on municipal fiscal authority).
14. See, e.g., JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE
PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 198 (2016).
15. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346 (1990) (suggesting that the crisis of the city is one of revenue, not authority).
16. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2020),
as reprinted in 100 N.C. L. REV. 1329, 1355 (2022) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. I was a co-drafter of this
project.
17. Id. at 1344–45.
18. Id. at 1353.
19. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997, 2004–
07 (2018) (describing various fiscal penalties imposed by punitive preemption). See generally Erin Adele
Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State—Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018)
[hereinafter Scharff, Hyper Preemption] (describing punitive preemption as “hyper preemption”);
Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018) (describing the
challenges and dangers of punitive preemption).
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tool to limit local authority, the Principles’ aid provision also articulates an anticoercion rule: “The state shall not place conditions on such intergovernmental
aid except as those conditions relate to expenditure of that aid and the state
shall not use the removal of such aid as a penalty for the exercise of a local
government’s home rule authority.”20
Together, the anti-coercion provision and the unfunded mandate
provision seek to limit state lawmakers’ ability to use their fiscal authority to
limit local democracy. In evaluating the success of the Principles, this Article
applies the proposed fiscal authority provisions to three recent examples of state
efforts to tie local fiscal support and taxing authority to substantive state policy
goals. Part I provides an overview of the current challenges to local fiscal
authority. Part II discusses Arizona’s S.B. 1487 and the investigation into
Maricopa County’s refusal to hand over server information to the state Senate’s
audit effort. Part III discusses Texas’s H.B. 1, which threatened the state’s
largest cities with a reduction in property tax authority should the cities choose
to reduce police funding. Part IV analyzes a hypothetical challenge to Arizona
Governor Doug Ducey’s modification of an educational grant program to
encourage schools to forgo mask mandates.
To be clear, these fiscal provisions are only one part of the Principles’
protections for local governments. In particular, some aspects of the states’
actions would likely run afoul of provisions limiting preemption over matters
of local concern. The Principles’ “Local Support for Democracy Provisions”
recognize the possibility that state legislatures would use the power of the purse
to indirectly constrain local authority when home rule prevents direct
constraints.21 Thus, there is value in considering these provisions separately. In
addition, unlike the Principles’ preemption provisions, these “local support”
provisions apply equally to home-rule and non-home-rule jurisdictions. This
Article concludes that the Principles’ fiscal provisions strengthen local
democracy, but also cautions that the key to protecting local authority remains
in the Principles’ articulation of the scope of home-rule immunity.
I. PURSE STRINGS AND TAXING AUTHORITY
The authority to make budget decisions is a hallmark of self-governance.
Local fiscal authority is inextricably linked to state fiscal decisions, as local
governments rely on state fiscal support.22 Unrestricted intergovernmental
20. PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1352.
21. Id. at 1338–40, 1348.
22. See generally Amanda Kass, Michael Pagano & Farhad Kaab Omeyr, How States Provide Cities
with General Revenue: An Analysis of Unrestricted State Aid 1–16 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y, Working
Paper No. 20AK1, 2020), https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/how-statesprovide-cities-general-revenue [https://perma.cc/X3FD-F57X] (discussing the role of unrestricted aid
in state budgets).
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transfers can represent a significant source of local revenues. Such transfers,
however, are not designed to influence spending choices. Rather, these
unrestricted intergovernmental transfers reflect an understanding that it is
often more efficient to raise revenue at the state level,23 even when a
commitment to local democracy allows for spending decisions to be made
locally.
As the California Supreme Court has observed, “Autonomy with regard
to the expenditure of public funds lies at the heart of what it means to be an
independent governmental entity.”24 However, state governments frequently
use state aid to influence local spending. By design, restrictive grant programs
seek to influence the spending priorities of local governments. Such financial
carrots are often unobjectionable and noncoercive. Local governments that wish
to accept state funding may do so, but they are also free to forgo such funding
and thus be unburdened by state spending priorities.
On the other hand, state unfunded mandates impose on local governments
the obligation to spend without requiring consent to the expenditures25 and thus
have long been criticized by local officials across the political spectrum.26
On the revenue side, state law has long constrained local fiscal authority.
In most states, local governments are limited in the amount and manner in
which they can borrow funds by both the state constitution and statutory law,27
and the majority of states do not include taxation as a home-rule power.28
In recent years, states have repeatedly run roughshod over even the limited
fiscal authority they have granted local governments. They have done so by
imposing significant funding conditions, not simply on individual grant
programs, but also on more general intergovernmental revenue sharing

23. Richard M. Bird, Fiscal Federalism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY
151, 151 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ehel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“[S]tate and local
governments are likely to end up with greater expenditure responsibilities than can be financed from
their own revenues. An important element of fiscal federalism from the beginning has thus been
recognition of the probable need for intergovernmental grants to close the revenue gap.”).
24. State Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 2012).
25. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 318 (8th ed. 2016) (“Unfunded mandates occur when states require local
governments to provide or expand existing local services, or to otherwise assume costly new
responsibilities, without providing their localities with the funds to cover the resulting costs.”).
26. Lawrence J. Grossback, The Problem of State-Imposed Mandates: Lessons from Minnesota’s Local
Governments, 34 ST. & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 183 passim (2002) (discussing broad concerns about
mandates from local officials in Minnesota); see Christopher Smith Gonzalez, State, Local Government
Look To Curb Unfunded Mandates, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2011), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/04/06/
state-local-government-to-curb-unfunded-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/4U89-ZPN4]. In many states,
state laws bar or limit such mandates. PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1373, 1382–84 (describing state
prohibitions).
27. Scharff, Powerful Cities?, supra note 13, at 295.
28. Id. at 296–304.
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programs,29 as well as by imposing significant fiscal penalties on local
governments.30 State lawmakers have also sought direct control over local
budget decisions. In the summer of 2021, both Texas and Florida took aim at
local spending decisions directly, seeking to limit local discretion about both
how much to spend on public safety and how to allocate such expenditures
between different city programs.31 While there are historical precedents for such
state efforts,32 this aggressive state action has few parallels in the modern era of
home rule.
Home rule might, in fact, provide protections against coercion of this sort.
A recent California Superior Court ruling suggests that California’s home rule
provides inherent protections against coercion.33 In that case, a nonprofit
challenged a state law prohibiting the state’s Department of Tax and Fee
Administration from administering local sales and use taxes in jurisdictions that
enacted sugar-sweetened beverage taxes.34 That law only applied the fiscal

29. See Act of Mar. 17, 2016, ch. 35, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 161 (codified as amended at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-194.01, 45-5029, 43-206 (2021)) (withholding state funding for any municipal
violations of state law); Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 403, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01A–B (2021)) (same).
30. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 23, 2010, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 451, 453 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051A, H–J (2021)) (imposing fiscal penalties on local
governments for adopting policies that limit or restrict enforcement of federal immigration laws); Act
of Apr. 27, 2017, act 28, 2017 Ga. Laws 92 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (2021))
(same); Act of May 17, 2017, ch. 4, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 7 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 752.053 (2021)) (same).
31. See Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified in scattered
sections of TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. & TEX. TAX CODE ANN.); see
also Act of Apr. 19, 2021, ch. 6, 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections of FLA.
STAT.).
32. See Rick Su, Anthony O’Rourke & Guyora Binder, Defunding Police Agencies, 71 EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 27–31), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3956241 [https://perma.cc/JV6Y-3HCL] (describing the historic origins of states funding restrictions
on local governments).
33. See Tentative Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate at 8–10, Cultiva La Salud v. California,
No. 34-2020-80003458 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Mandate
Ruling].
34. Id. at 2. The law itself, the “Keep Groceries Affordable Act of 2018,” ch. 61, 2018 Ca. Stat.
1843 (codified at CAL. REV. & TAX. §§ 7284.8–.16 (2021)), was passed basically under duress. As
Governor Brown suggested in his signing statement, in response to local interest in sugar-sweetened
beverage taxes:
[T]he beverage industry has circulated a far reaching initiative that would, if passed, raise the
approval threshold from 50% to two-thirds on all measures, on all topics in all 482 cities.
Mayors from countless cities have called to voice their alarm and to strongly support the
compromise which this bill represents. The initiative also contains language that would restrict
the normal regulatory capacity of the state by imposing a two-thirds legislative vote on what
is now solely within the competency of state agencies. This would be an abomination. For
these reasons, I believe Assembly Bill 1838 is in the public interest and must be signed.
Petition for Writ of Mandate Ruling, supra note 33, at 4 (quoting signing statement).
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penalty when a city imposed a tax, fee, or other assessment that was “a valid
exercise of a city’s authority under Section 5 of Article XI of the California
Constitution with respect to the municipal affairs of that city.”35 Because the
state sales tax law required this department to collect local sales taxes, the law,
in effect, prohibited local governments from obtaining local sales tax revenue,
should they decide to also impose a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages.36 The
court held this provision was “unconstitutional on its face; it violates the Home
Rule Provision via financial coercion.”37
The California court ruling is important, but it does not necessarily
suggest that local governments in other states may be afforded similar
protection. When compared to home rule in most other states, California’s
home rule is generally more protective of local authority.38 Elsewhere, there is
little precedent suggesting such an anti-coercion principle exists under state
constitutional home-rule provisions. As a result, legal arguments about the
validity of these state actions are mostly speculative. Perhaps such actions
violate some—as yet legally unarticulated—notion of home rule; perhaps they
do not. The Principles made this anti-coercion rule explicit to ensure local
governments such protection.
II. ARIZONA’S 2020 AUDIT AND S.B. 1487: HYPER PREEMPTION AS A TOOL
OF DEMOCRATIC DE-LEGITIMACY
A.

S.B. 1487

S.B. 1487 is Arizona’s punitive preemption law that allows any member of
the Arizona state legislature to file a complaint with the state’s attorney general
alleging that a local government’s action violates state law.39 Under the law, if
the attorney general’s investigation reveals a violation, the locality must cure it
or the state will withhold the locality’s portion of state shared revenue, a
substantial portion of local budgets.40
Because there is virtually no substantive limit on what members of the
legislature can ask the attorney general to investigate, S.B. 1487 complaints have
challenged everything from local zoning requirements to hot potato political

35.
36.
37.
38.

CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7284.12(f)(2) (Westlaw through Ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
Petition for Writ of Mandate Ruling, supra note 33, at 5.
Id. at 10.
See DALE A. KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA:
A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 476 tbl.A1 (2001) (listing California and Colorado as the only two states
with “[b]road structural + functional” municipal home rule authority).
39. Act of Mar. 17, 2016, ch. 35, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 161 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-194.01, 45-5029, 43-206 (2021)).
40. Id. at 161–62.
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issues like vaccine mandates.41 It is thus unsurprising that the Arizona Senate’s
efforts to audit Maricopa County’s 2020 election results ended in an S.B. 1487
complaint.
Arizona’s much-mocked election audit was a circus.42 The Arizona Senate
contracted with a firm called Cyber Ninjas to conduct the audit.43 Cyber Ninjas
had been heavily criticized for their lack of experience in election integrity and
for their lax audit security protocols.44 As part of this “audit,” the state Senate
subpoenaed Maricopa County’s internal servers.45 It was widely understood that
the Senate would hand the servers over to Cyber Ninjas.46 Maricopa County
objected, insisting that handing over the servers would jeopardize sensitive
information, including county residents’ social security numbers, and leave
confidential law enforcement communication systems vulnerable to hackers.47
Before this issue could be resolved by the Arizona courts, a member of the
Arizona legislature filed an S.B. 1487 complaint asking the Attorney General to
determine whether the county’s refusal to comply with the subpoena violated
state law.48 In August 2021, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office issued an
opinion concluding that the county had committed a violation.49
In the opinion, the Attorney General determined that the county conceded
the validity of the subpoena when it failed to appeal a superior court ruling
upholding the validity of a separate, earlier subpoena.50 As the opinion explains:
[T]he [Arizona] Superior Court previously decided, under circumstances
materially similar to those here, that the Senators’ subpoenas were valid
and enforceable under Arizona law. That partial judgment, which the
41. See SB1487 Investigations, ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN. (2021), https://www.azag.gov/complaints/
sb1487-investigations [https://perma.cc/2PQW-BSG6].
42. See Ronald J. Hansen, Yvonne Wingett Sanchez & Jen Fifield, ‘You’ll Get Nothing Out of This’:
Partisans with Limited Experience Stumble Through Gaffe-Prone ‘Audit,’ ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 22, 2021),
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/20/arizona-audit-partisans-stum
ble-through-gaffe-prone-election-review/6124420001/ [https://perma.cc/FSL4-8C95 (dark archive)]
(describing the audit as “a bizarre distraction from reality led by amateurs” and “gaffe-prone”).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Jen Fifield & Mary Jo Pitzl, Maricopa County and Dominion Won’t Comply with New
Subpoenas Issued by Arizona Senate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2021/08/02/maricopa-co-and-dominion-face-monday-deadline-ariz-sena
te-election-subpoenas/5434136001/ [https://perma.cc/2GS2-Z5M2 (dark archive)] (explaining that the
audit would be conducted by Cyber Ninjas).
47. Id.
48. MARK BRNOVICH, ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT NO. 21-002, at 3–4 (2021),
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/docs/complaints/sb1487/21-002/MCBOS_1487_Report-8-26.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U3E9-5JC8].
49. Id. at 1–2.
50. Id. at 4–5; see also Maricopa County v. Fann, No. CV 2020-016840, 2021 WL 804446, at *15
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2021) (finding a legislative subpoena related to election reform measures to
be valid and enforceable in an earlier litigation).
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Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (“MCBOS”) chose not to appeal,
remains binding on MCBOS and has preclusive effect between MCBOS
and the Senate.51
In a footnote in the opinion, the Attorney General’s Office then
disclaimed the application of preclusion: “Whether issue preclusion technically
applies is not dispositive; instead, the legal test here is whether ‘existing law
clearly and unambiguously compels th[e] conclusion.’”52 But, as the Attorney
General’s opinion makes clear, the scope of the Senate’s subpoena authority
over confidential documents was an issue of first impression in Arizona’s courts.
As the Arizona Supreme Court recognized, it is possible that “a local [action]
arguably violates state law, but the issue is not settled by existing case law.”53 In
such cases, the Arizona Supreme Court held that S.B. 1487’s procedures require
the Attorney General to issue a “may violate” opinion, which triggers a special
action at the Supreme Court to resolve the outstanding legal question.54 A single
trial court decision does not establish clear and unambiguous law; superior court
decisions are not precedential. The Attorney General concedes this when it
acknowledged that the county could cure the violation through a “judicial
resolution with the Senate,” presumably recognizing that the superior court
might reach a different conclusion about this subsequent subpoena.55
Even so, the Attorney General threatened Maricopa County with the loss
of hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.56 The county and the Senate
eventually reached a settlement: the county agreed to abandon its $2.8 million
claim against the Senate for damage to election machines in exchange for the
Senate dropping its effort to require the county to turn its servers over to the
Senate.57
This dispute and the ultimate settlement highlight the ways S.B. 1487
turbocharges disputes between the state and its local governments. The validity
of the subpoena was already before a court; the Senate had the authority to hold
the county in contempt—at least once it came back into session.58 The Attorney
51. BRNOVICH, supra note 48, at 4–5 (discussing Fann, 2021 WL 804446, at *15).
52. Id. at 5 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
53. State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 670 (Ariz. 2017).
54. Id. at 669.
55. BRNOVICH, supra note 48, at 2.
56. Mary Jo Pitzl, Attorney General: Maricopa County Supervisors Violated Law by Not Complying
with Election Audit Subpoena, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
politics/election/2021/08/26/arizona-election-audit-attorney-general-says-maricopa-county-broke-law
-subpoenas/5601498001/ [https://perma.cc/3VAV-G5KY/ (dark archive)].
57. Jerod MacDonald-Evoy, Maricopa County, Senate Reach Agreement To End Subpoena Fight over
Routers, ARIZ. MIRROR (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.azmirror.com/2021/09/17/county-senate-reachagreement-to-end-subpoena-fight-over-routers/ [https://perma.cc/PU66-KKWL].
58. See Press Release, Arizona Att’y Gen. Mark Brnovich, AG Brnovich: Maricopa County Must
Comply with Senate’s Legislative Subpoena or Forfeit State Funds (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.
azag.gov/press-release/ag-brnovich-maricopa-county-must-comply-senates-legislative-subpoena-or-
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General opinion short-circuited these procedures. And yet, to date, the Arizona
Supreme Court has upheld the basic structure of S.B. 1487 against
constitutional challenge.59
B.

S.B. 1487 Under the Anti-Coercion Provision

How would the S.B. 1487 fare under the Principles? The Principles limits
conditions on intergovernmental aid to those that “relate to expenditure of that
aid.”60 Under this rule, conditions are subject to a nexus requirement; the
conditions must “relate” to the aid.
In the context of this S.B. 1487 investigation, the relevant question under
the anti-coercion provision is whether a legal requirement that the county
comply with the Senate subpoena relates to the county’s expenditure of state
shared revenues. The state-shared revenues support the county’s general fund,
so the funding supports all ongoing operations, including the sheriff’s
department, county jails, county libraries, and county parks.61 It is hard to
understand in what way compliance with the audit “relates” to the operation of
these programs and services.
Under this reading, the Principles suggests that general revenue transfers
can be subject to general spending restrictions, like accounting requirements,
but they cannot be withdrawn as a penalty for the exercise of local policy
discretion.
The commentary provided in the Principles suggests that state courts could
borrow from existing Federal Spending Clause jurisprudence in interpreting
this rule. The commentary notes the parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB”).62
As the Supreme Court held in that case, “Conditions that do not . . . govern the
use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis. When, for example,
such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring
forfeit-state [https://perma.cc/JY49-7V6W]. Even if the structure of S.B. 1487 does not generally
violate Arizona’s constitutional protection of the separation of powers, it is possible that the Attorney
General’s decision to weigh in on an ongoing legal dispute did. See Tucson Urging High Court To Overturn
Law Penalizing Cities, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/politics/arizona/2017/02/27/tucson-urging-high-court-to-overturn-law-penalizing-cities/984874
38/ [https://perma.cc/3XXS-9UZT].
59. See State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 669 (Ariz. 2017) (“Because S.B.
1487 ‘leaves the judiciary free to make its own determination based on the particular facts of a case, it
comports with separation of powers.’” (citations omitted)); State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Phoenix,
468 P.3d 1200, 1209 (Ariz. 2020) (finding the bond requirement of S.B. 1487 “so incomplete that we
cannot enforce it” but otherwise adjudicating the case under S.B. 1487’s provisions).
60. PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1352.
61. See MacDonald-Evoy, supra note 57 (estimating that the state shared revenue at stake
accounted for forty-two percent of the county’s budget for the current fiscal year).
62. 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1382.
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the States to accept policy changes.”63 Under this anti-coercion principle, S.B.
1487 could be challenged as placing an unduly coercive condition on the receipt
of state shared revenues.
Faced with an anti-coercion challenge, the state might argue that S.B. 1487
does not impose additional requirements for local governments. Rather, it
creates a separate adjudicative process for determining the scope of existing
state law requirements and imposes a penalty for the failure to comply. As a
factual matter, this process has proven coercive. S.B. 1487 has discouraged local
governments in Arizona from adopting policies at the edge of their home-rule
authority; the litigation risk is simply not worth it. For example, despite
arguments that the Governor exceeded his legal authority in blocking local mask
mandates by executive order,64 no local government risked imposing such a
mandate.65
But the state might argue that this problem is distinct from the legal
concerns present in the federal anti-coercion doctrine. The crux of the states’
challenge in NFIB was that under the Affordable Care Act,66 states could not
reject Medicaid expansion without risking their eligibility for the existing
Medicaid program.67 At the same time, Congress did not have the power to
directly require states to expand Medicaid.68 The federal anti-coercion doctrine,
then, preserves a policy space for the state governments. The doctrine provides
a constitutional protection for this space, freeing states from pressure to
conform their budgets to the federal government’s preferences, at least when
federal preferences lack a sufficient relationship to the spending program at
issue.
Under this view, the scope of the state’s authority turns on whether homerule immunity prevents the state from directly imposing the condition. As a
result, anti-coercion would protect only home-rule jurisdictions, and only to the
extent that home rule provides immunity from state preemption. If Arizona
could require the county to comply with its subpoena request, the state could
use S.B. 1487 to enforce that requirement.

63. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 580.
64. See Josh Bendor & Erin Scharff, Gov. Doug Ducey Is Wrong. Cities and Counties Have Broad
Authority To Act on COVID-19, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 9, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
opinion/op-ed/2020/07/09/gov-doug-ducey-wrong-arizona-cities-broad-power-act-coronavirus/53961
25002/ [https://perma.cc/3GA9-GHSC (dark archive)].
65. See Allison Steinbach, Do Arizonans Still Have To Wear Masks? Here’s What We Know After
Ducey Lifts COVID-19 Restrictions, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/local/112rizona/2021/03/25/112rizona-mask-mandate-heres-what-we-know-after-ducey-relaxesrules/7002251002/ [https://perma.cc/J85C-QDKW (dark archive)].
66. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
67. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 575.
68. See id. at 578.
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Given the Principles’ commitment to local authority and its explicit
concerns about rising punitive preemption, the better reading of the provision
is that it requires a nexus regardless of the state’s ability to separately limit local
authority. This interpretation also ensures that non-home-rule jurisdictions are
protected by the anti-coercion rule. This reading highlights, however, the ways
that the federal anti-coercion caselaw may not fully capture the complexities of
the state-local relationship.
III. H.B. 1900 AND POLICE REFORM: HYPER PREEMPTION OF LOCAL
BUDGETING
The video footage of a Minneapolis police officer murdering George
Floyd sparked massive Black Lives Matter protests nationwide.69 Among the
demands of many protestors was a call to “defund the police.”70 Advocates have
differing views of the goals of the “defund” movement, from radical police
abolition to the more reformist goal of reallocating portions of the police budget
and public safety responsibilities to other departments.71 Few cities have made
significant changes to their police budgets despite these efforts.72 Austin, Texas,
is a notable exception.
In August 2020, the city voted to cut about a third of its police department
budget.73 These budget cuts included both direct cuts and shifts in spending,
such as moving units like forensic sciences, support services, and victims’
services into other city departments and the reallocation of $50 million from
the city’s “Reimagine Safety Fund” to alternate programming.74
Texas’s state leadership was uniformly critical of Austin’s decision.
Governor Greg Abbott argued that “Austin’s decision puts the brave men and
women of the Austin Police Department and their families at greater risk and
paves the way for lawlessness. . . . Public safety is job one, and Austin has
abandoned that duty.”75 Attorney General Ken Paxton asserted that the “city
69. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/3Y92-D928 (dark archive)].
70. See Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html [http://perma
.cc/NBU7-GME8 (dark archive)].
71. Su et al., supra note 32, at 3.
72. See Rachel Hatzipanagos, What ‘Defund the Police’ Might Look Like, WASH. POST (June
12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/black-lives-matter-defund-police-iscountry-ready/ [https://perma.cc/57NT-ENF2 (dark archive)].
73. Meena Venkataramanan, Austin City Council Cuts Police Department Budget by One-Third,
Mainly Through Reorganizing Some Duties out from Law Enforcement Oversight, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 13,
2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/08/13/austin-city-council-cut-police-budget-defund/ [https
://perma.cc/U34D-9C3H].
74. Id.
75. Id.
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council’s action to slash funding disregards the safety of our capital city, its
citizens, and the many guests who frequent it.”76
Because the Texas legislature meets only biennially, the legislature was not
in session to respond to Austin’s funding shifts.77 But Governor Abbott
promised that the legislature would respond to “protect Austin” when it
reconvened in 2021,78 and Abbott kept this promise. This part both describes
the resulting Texas legislation and analyzes it under the Principles’ proposed
anti-coercion and unfunded mandate provisions.
A.

H.B. 1900

On June 1, 2021, Governor Abbott signed into law H.B. 1900, which places
significant constraints on the ability of large Texas cities to control their own
police budgets.79
Under the law, certain jurisdictions may be declared “defunding
municipalit[ies]” if the Criminal Justice Division of the Texas Office of the
Governor determines that the municipality has reduced its police department
funding as compared to the previous year’s budget.80 The law makes two
exceptions. It does not apply when cuts to the police department budget are
consistent with across-the-board cuts in the size of the city’s budget.81 Nor does
it apply when the governor’s office approves the budget cuts.82
The “defunding municipality” designation incurs a significant fiscal
penalty. Cities determined to be “defunding municipalities” are prohibited
from increasing property tax rates, even to adopt previously voter-approved tax
rate increases, and in fact, must impose a tax cut to reflect the reduction in
police spending.83 Moreover, the law limits the ability of municipally owned
utilities to increase rates and fees and prohibits the transfer of any revenue from
rate or fee increases to the city’s general fund.84 Finally, the law allows the state
76. Id.
77. See Texas Legislative Sessions and Years, LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. TEX., https://lrl.texas.gov/
sessions/sessionYears.cfm [https://perma.cc/AV73-AW4V] (showing that the legislature met in 2019
and 2021, but not in 2020).
78. See Venkataramanan, supra note 73.
79. Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections
of TEX. GOV’T CODE, TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE & TEX. TAX CODE); see also Su et al., supra note 32,
at 18–20 (putting H.B. 1900 and Florida’s H.B. 1 in the context of the historical role of state
governments in limiting local police control); Megan Munce, Gov. Greg Abbott Signs Slate of Legislation
To Increase Criminal Penalties for Protesters, Punish Cities That Reduce Police Budgets, TEX. TRIB. (June 1,
2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/01/texas-abbott-defund-police-protest/ [https://perma.
cc/F8B8-77S8].
80. Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 1999, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE § 109.003 (2021)).
81. Id. (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 109.004(a)(1) (2021)).
82. Id. (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 109.004(a)(2) (2021)).
83. Id. (codified at TEX. TAX CODE §§ 26.044, .0501 (2021)).
84. Id. (codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 33.0211 (2021)).
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to charge a “defunding municipality” for the cost of state-provided law
enforcement in the jurisdiction, as determined by the governor’s office.85 This
charge is paid out of the municipality’s sales and uses tax revenue that is
collected by the state on behalf of the municipality.86
H.B. 1900 only applies to cities with populations greater than 250,000.87
As of 2021, this limits the law’s application to eleven cities: Houston, San
Antonio, Dallas, Austin, Fort Worth, El Paso, Arlington, Corpus Christi,
Plano, Laredo, and Lubbock.88 News accounts made clear, however, that the bill
targeted Austin’s defunding efforts.89 In addition to the evidence from the
legislative debate, of the eleven cities potentially affected by H.B. 1900, only
Austin operates a municipal electrical utility.90 The consequences to Austin
under the bill illustrate the pressure the statute places on large Texas cities to
maintain current police funding levels. Among other consequences, “Austin
Energy and Austin Water could be prohibited from transferring any utility
revenue to the city’s general fund.”91 The Austin-American Statesman estimated
that such a prohibition would prohibit a transfer of $160 million, or “15% of the
city’s revenue funding services like police and fire in 2020.”92
Because the budget base year under the statute is 2019, the law required
Austin to restore its previously enacted budget cuts, even though the statute
was passed after Austin approved its FY 2021 budget.93 Though at least one
member of the city council wanted to seek a waiver from the application of H.B.
1900, the city approved a FY 2022 budget that restored the budget cuts.94
85. Id. (codified at TEX. TAX CODE § 321.5025(c) (2021)).
86. Id. (codified at TEX. TAX CODE § 321.5025(b) (2021)).
87. Id. (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 109.002 (2021)).
88. List of Municipalities in Texas, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_municipal
ities_in_Texas [https://perma.cc/5UQP-SS69] (Dec. 7, 2021).
89. Philip Jankowski, How Will Texas’ ‘Defund the Police’ Bill Affect Austin? Leaders Aren’t Sure,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (May 28, 2021), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/05/28/texasdefund-police-bill-heads-greg-abbott-austin-leaders-unsure-future/7453268002/ [https://perma.cc/H
W86-FTL7] (staff uploaded, dark archive)] (“While HB 1900 applies to Texas’ 11 largest cities, the bill
was clearly written with Austin in mind and designed to undo Austin City Council action last year that
reduced Austin Police Department’s budget and reallocated millions by removing some operations
from the police department.”).
90. TPPA Member Utilities, TEX. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://tppa.com/members/ [https://
perma.cc/D86M-UTJS].
91. Jankowski, supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. (West) (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE § 109.0035 (2021)) (comparing the FY 2021 budget to the highest budget in place in the previous
two years).
94. Ryan Autullo, Police Funding, Homeless Spending, Vaccination Bonuses Headline Austin Budget
Discussions, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Aug. 11, 2021, 7:19 AM), https://www.statesman.com/story/
news/2021/08/11/police-funding-homeless-spending-vaccination-bonuses-headline-austin-budget-disc
ussions/5546802001/ [https://perma.cc/YEB5-QGUF] (“After cutting money from the Police
Department last summer, the council is prepared to restore it to avoid penalties from a new state law
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H.B. 1900 imposes a significant financial penalty on defunding
municipalities. Even when local voters support shifting public safety dollars
away from municipal policing budgets, municipal officials are unlikely to risk
such a loss of property tax dollars. As a result, H.B. 1900 induces local
governments to maintain their current levels of police spending, as it was
intended to do. Under current Texas law, it is difficult to challenge these actions
as a violation of municipal home rule.95 The next section considers whether the
Principles offers more protection for local budget authority.
B.

H.B. 1900 Under the Anti-Coercion and Unfunded Mandate Provision

The Principles project envisions a constitutional provision that would
require that conditions on intergovernmental aid relate to the expenditure of
that aid and would further restrict the state from removing aid as a penalty for
the exercise of a local government’s home-rule authority.96 In the commentary
to the project, we suggested that courts could borrow from existing Federal
Spending Clause jurisprudence, noting the parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in NFIB.97 As the Court held in that case,
Conditions that do not . . . govern the use of the funds, however, cannot
be justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions take the
form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the
conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to
accept policy changes.98
H.B. 1900, however, is far from the “good deal” that Congress offered
states in exchange for Medicaid expansion. There is, in fact, no deal on the table
and no restriction on intergovernmental aid. As a result, there is no
“unconstitutional condition” being added to state spending power and thus no
problem to be addressed by the anti-coercion principle.
Instead, the state threatens significant limits on local taxing authority
should governments adopt budgets with spending priorities that differ from the
states. The question of whether such limits would meet the new, more stringent
aimed at punishing cities that remove funding from their police department budgets.”); Ryan Autullo,
Austin Council OKs $4.5B Budget That Includes Tax Break, $65 Million in Homeless Spending, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN (Aug. 12, 2021, 11:16 PM), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/08/12/austincity-council-oks-4-5-b-budget-includes-tax-break-65-million-homeless-spending/8110988002/ [http://
perma.cc/9879-YN6G] (describing the budget passed by the Austin City Council as resembling a
proposal by the city manager).
95. Though there is a legal challenge pending against Florida’s efforts to restrain local police
spending, no similar challenge has been filed in Texas. See Dara Kam, Florida Cities Challenge State’s
Protest Law over Budget Power, WLRN (Nov. 16, 2021, 4:26 PM), https://www.wlrn.org/news/2021-1116/florida-cities-challenge-states-protest-law-over-budget-power [https://perma.cc/3B3U-9YKT].
96. PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1352.
97. Id. at 1382 (discussing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012)).
98. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 580.
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preemption standard is beyond the scope of this Article.99 In the end, it may be
that restricting state preemption authority is the most effective way to limit
state fiscal coercion. That position is in keeping with the California court’s
decision in Cultiva La Salud,100 where the court expressly held that the state
could not impose limits on local taxing authority in order to circumvent the
immunity from state preemption granted by the California Constitution.101
Some aspects of H.B. 1900 might, however, be challenged under the
Principles’ unfunded mandate provision. Texas does not have a prohibition on
unfunded mandates, though state law does require some tracking of these
mandates.102 Under the National League of Cities’ proposal, states are
prohibited from either “requir[ing] local governments to provide additional
services or undertak[ing] new activities without providing an additional
appropriation that fully funds the newly mandated service or activity.”103
The question, then, is whether the state’s requirement that the local
government maintain its current level of police funding constitutes a
requirement of an “additional service” or a “new activity.” Certainly, there is
some force to the idea that if a state wants local governments to maintain a
specific police expenditure level, then the state ought to pay for this expense.
However, the language of the provision does not obviously suggest that such a
requirement would constitute an unfunded mandate. A city seeking to avoid
designation as a “defunding municipality” is not required to provide an
“additional service” or engage in a “new activity.” The law does not even clearly

99. Paul Diller addresses some of these questions in his work for this Symposium. Paul A. Diller,
Is Enhanced Judicial Review the Correct Antidote to Excessive State Preemption?, 100 N.C. L. REV. 1469
(2022).
100. Petition for Writ of Mandate Ruling, supra note 33.
101. Id. at 10.
102. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 320.001–.004 (Westlaw through the end of the 2021
Reg. & Called Sesss. of the 87th Leg.). Local officials have long complained about state laws that both
restrict their revenue and also require significant new expenditures. TEX. ASS’N OF CNTYS.,
UNFUNDED MANDATES (2020), https://www.county.org/TAC/media/TACMedia/Legislative/Legis
lative-Brief/Unfunded-Mandates-Aug-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/96FF-RWD4]; Sarah Lazarowitz,
Unfunded Mandate Legislation, TEX. CNTY. PROGRESS (Feb. 1, 2021), https://countyprogress.com/
unfunded-mandate-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/E8L6-DSAC]; TEX. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS &
TEX. ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., REPORT ON SCHOOL DISTRICT MANDATES: COST DRIVERS IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 4 (2018), https://tasanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2018-Report-on-School-Dist
rict-Mandates.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HUL-NCMA]; Legislative Update: 2021 Resolutions, CNTY.
JUDGES & COMM’RS ASS’N TEX. (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.cjcat.org/page/cjcat-LegislativeUpdate
[https://perma.cc/SGW7-HQUA]. In fact, at one time, even Governor Abbott recognized the problem,
observing in his 2019 State of the State Address that “Texas must limit the ability of taxing authorities
to raise your property taxes. At the same time, Texas must end unfunded mandates on cities and
counties.” Ross Ramsey, Analysis: Unfunded State Mandates Have a New Enemy—the Governor of Texas,
TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/01/22/unfunded-mandates-newenemy-governor-texas/ [https://perma.cc/8FRY-8CJF].
103. PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1353.
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require an increase in police funding. Rather, the law mandates the city
maintain the funding status quo.
That being said, the requirement that the city reimburse the state for
“public safety costs” would seem to run afoul of the unfunded mandate. While
typical unfunded mandates require local governments to provide the additional
service or new activity directly, the language of the prohibition does not require
such a direct service provision. It simply prohibits the state from requiring local
governments to provide the service. Under H.B. 1900, Texas is requiring cities
to foot the bill for a new service: state-provided public safety enforcement.
Neither the anti-coercion provision nor the unfunded mandate provision
seem to limit Texas’s ability to condition local taxing authority on municipal
compliance with the state spending priorities. Nevertheless, the unfunded
mandate provision would prevent Texas from requiring local governments to
reimburse the state for costs associated with the state’s perceived needs to
increase state public safety spending within a local jurisdiction.
IV. ARIZONA’S EDUCATION GRANTS
On June 28, 2021, as part of its K-12 budget bill, the Arizona legislature
enacted a number of provisions that limited the policies that public school
districts could adopt to mitigate the risks of COVID-19.104 The prohibitions
included bans on vaccine requirements and masking requirements.105 To allow
for the possibility of a citizen referendum, most Arizona laws become effective
ninety days after enacted.106 Arizona’s public schools start in early August, and
so, after some initial confusion, many school districts adopted mask
requirements to remain in effect at least until the ban was in effect.107
Facing backlash from anti-mask Republican activists, Arizona Governor
Doug Ducey announced a $163 million grant program that conditioned
eligibility on compliance with state law.108 This grant program, known as the
Education Plus-Up Grant, was designed for school districts who were ineligible
104. Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 405, § 39, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 26-307 note (2021)); Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 409, §§ 12–13, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv.
(West) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-672, -681 to 82 (2021)).
105. Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 405, § 39, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West); Act of June 30, 2021, ch.
409, §§ 12–13, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West).
106. Ninety days is the deadline for gathering signatures for a referendum, which automatically
stays a statute. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3).
107. Yana Kunichoff, Suburban School Districts in Metro Phoenix Are Rethinking Mask Mandates.
Here’s Why, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizonaeducation/2021/08/19/suburban-school-districts-metro-phoenix-rethink-mask-mandates-court-ruling/
8169145002/ [https://perma.cc/53VS-QFJB (dark archive)].
108. News Release, Off. of the Governor Doug Ducey, Governor Ducey Announces $163 Million
To Increase Per Pupil Funding in Schools (Aug. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Ducey Press Release], http://az
governor.gov/governor/news/2021/08/governor-ducey-announces-163-million-increase-pupil-funding
-schools [https://perma.cc/F2B3-TPRH].
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for previous federal relief that had been made available to high-poverty schools
and school districts.109 Ducey’s press release made it clear that the state law he
was most concerned about was the law prohibiting mask requirements: “Parents
are in the driver’s seat, and it’s their right to make decisions that best fit the
needs of their children. Safety recommendations are welcomed and
encouraged—mandates that place more stress on students and families aren’t.”110
To alleviate any doubt that schools were expected to comply with prohibitions
on mask requirements even before the state law was in effect, the announcement
clarified that the funding “is contingent on being in full compliance with state
law, including Laws 2021, Chapter 404, the FY 2022 K-12 Budget
Reconciliation Bill for the entirety of the 2021–2022 school year.”111
As a policy matter, of course, one could object to the wisdom of the state
conditioning education funding on schools flouting public health guidance. At
the same time, it would seem relatively uncontroversial to require state grant
recipients to follow state law. However, Ducey’s announcement went further
than merely requiring compliance with state law. By requiring compliance with
Chapter 404 of the session law112—which prohibited mask requirements—for
the “entirety of the 2021–2022 school year,”113 Ducey prohibited mask
requirements even when such requirements were allowed under state law. And
when the mask ban was declared unconstitutional by an Arizona superior court
judge, Ducey made his intent even clearer: he announced the grant program
would be open only to schools that imposed no masking requirements.114
The Education Plus-Up program is funded by federal COVID-19 relief
dollars,115 and U.S. Treasury regulations make clear that such funds can be used
to implement COVID-19-related public health measures, such as mask
mandates.116 Using that federal aid to undermine public health would seem an
improper use of even the state’s broad spending discretion under the federal
program.
In the context of an exploration of the Principles, however, this Article is
concerned with whether this condition would be unconstitutionally coercive
under the proposed home-rule framework. Under the anti-coercion principle,
conditions on grants must “relate to the expenditure of that aid.” How tight
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Act of June 30, 2021, ch. 404, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections
of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.).
113. Ducey Press Release, supra note 108.
114. Jim Small, Ducey: Schools Won’t Get COVID Aid Money If They Require Masks, ARIZ. MIRROR
(Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.azmirror.com/2021/08/17/ducey-schools-wont-get-covid-aid-money-ifthey-require-masks/ [https://perma.cc/UGL2-9PUT].
115. See id.
116. Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds, 31 C.F.R. §§ 35.1–.12 (2021).
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must the fit be under this requirement? Under the federalism jurisprudence of
the federal courts, anti-coercion restricts Congress’s ability to use its spending
power. Under this Spending Clause framework, as articulated in South Dakota
v. Dole,117 “conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”118
And as the Supreme Court elaborated in NFIB, even if the condition is related
to the federal interest, it may still run afoul if “‘the financial inducement offered
by Congress’ was ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which “pressure turns into
compulsion.”’”119
Applying the Dole framework requires an analysis of the government
interest in the Education Plus-Up Grant Program.120 According to the Office
of the Arizona Governor, the grant program “is designed to further aid in the
mitigation of the economic impacts of COVID-19 and further ensure financial
stability to Arizona Local Education Agencies . . . in preparation for the 2021–
2022 school year.”121 Governor Ducey frames the ban on mask mandates as
consistent with the purpose of the program, that is, getting schools open and
returning to normal.122 That the ban on mask mandates was put in place after
the program was announced makes it challenging to argue that the mask ban is
related the program’s goals. Moreover, banning mask requirements seems
inconsistent with the goal of ensuring schools remain open given that the
Arizona Department of Health Services was still recommending students be
masked in schools when the governor made his announcement. Litigants would
seem to be in a strong position to argue that the state’s interest in the Education
Plus-Up Grant Program was not sufficiently related to the state’s interest in
allowing students to attend school unmasked.
Even if a court were to find the grant program’s purpose is sufficiently
related to the ban on mask requirements, litigants could still pursue the anticoercion claim. Under NFIB, grants can still be unconstitutional when they are
“so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”123
117. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
118. Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
119. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
211).
120. Cf. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (“By enacting § 158, Congress conditioned the receipt of federal
funds in a way reasonably calculated to address this particular impediment to a purpose for which the
funds are expended.”).
121. Education Plus-Up (EPU) Grant Program, ARIZ. TOGETHER (2021), https://arizonatogether.
org/educationplusup/ [https://perma.cc/4WKN-YEL4].
122. Yana Kunichoff, These Arizona School Districts Received Grants from Ducey’s Controversial
COVID-19 Program, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
arizona-education/2021/10/08/these-arizona-schools-got-money-doug-ducey-covid-19-program/60247
04001/ [https://perma.cc/S8C4-S3YN (dark archive)].
123. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 580 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
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Because the funding formula for the grant program depended on the aid school
districts had previously received, the funding at stake for school districts and
individual charter schools varied.124 For some school districts, the amount of
funding at stake was small. For others, however, the funding was quite
significant. The two largest grants went to suburban Chandler Unified, which
received roughly $11.1 million, and suburban Tucson’s Vail Unified, which
received over $12 million.125 For Chandler Unified, the Education Plus-Up
grant represented almost three percent of their projected FY 2022 budget.126
For Vail Unified, the money represented more than ten percent of the proposed
FY 2022 maintenance and operating budget.127 For these districts, it would seem
that the proposal was unconstitutionally coercive. There was simply too much
aid at stake for the districts to choose to forgo the grant program.
As this analysis suggests, there are strong arguments that the Education
Plus-Up Grant Program would run afoul of the anti-coercion provision
contained in the Principles. Analyzing the program under the Supreme Court’s
spending jurisprudence, as commentary on the Principles suggests was the intent
of the provision, the program’s ban on mask requirements seems unrelated to
its larger purpose, and especially for those districts receiving large Education
Plus-Up grants, the amount of the grant itself might be considered to be unduly
coercive.
V. BREAKING THE CHAINS OF FISCAL PREEMPTION
This Article is an imaginative exercise. To date, no jurisdiction has even
considered adopting the Principles. Engaging in this exercise, however, helps us
understand both the stakes and the limits of legal reform.
Texas’s S.B. 1900 imposes a direct limit on local budget discretion, while
Arizona’s S.B. 1487 imposes fiscal sanctions that also effectively limit local
policy choice. Both laws reduce local authority in areas where local majorities
are in conflict with elected state leadership.128 Arizona’s Governor Ducey
124. See Kunichoff, supra note 122 (showing a table indicating grants ranging from $10,676 to
$12,364,177).
125. Id.
126. Calculations were done by the author. See id. (indicating that Chandler Unified School
District received $11,104,833 from the Education Plus-Up grant); CHANDLER UNIFIED SCH. DIST.,
ANNUAL EXPENDITURE BUDGET (July 15, 2021), https://www.ade.az.gov/sfsinbound/General
Upload/175183.xls [https://perma.cc/CJ8K-Z4AR] (showing the total approved expenditures for
maintenance and operations of FY 2022 as $333,113,197).
127. Calculations were done by the author. See Kunichoff, supra note 122 (indicating that Vail
Unified School District received $12,364,177 from the Education Plus-Up grant); VAIL UNIFIED SCH.
DIST., PROPOSED EXPENDITURE BUDGET 1 (June 25, 2021), https://core-docs.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/asset/uploaded_file/1513713/FY_2021-2022_Proposed_Expenditure_Budget.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4VXJ-WPZR] (showing an adopted maintenance and operations budget of $102,149,282).
128. It is unclear how statewide elected majorities feel about these debates. Certainly, the
defunding movement lacks popular support in Texas statewide, but polling suggests potential state
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dangled the carrot of additional state education funds in exchange for forgoing
mask mandates. Questions of election integrity, police brutality, and masking
are not simply hot-button flash points—the outcomes of these debates have real
effects on lives and on the very strength of American democracy. In different
ways, each of these efforts used the threat of local budget cuts and the
elimination of local budget discretion to force local governments in line with
state policy goals.
To date, legal challenges to such efforts have focused on procedural
problems with their enactment or substantive questions over local home-rule
authority. In at least two examples, Governor Ducey’s efforts to thwart school
mask mandates and S.B. 1487’s punitive fiscal provisions, the Principles fiscal
provisions provide a strong legal case for challenging state action. The Principles
would also provide for the possibility of challenging S.B. 1487 as unduly
coercive. Texas’s efforts to limit local discretion over public safety budgets is
probably better challenged under the model’s home-rule provisions.
Efforts to thwart local control have been seemingly boundless in their
creativity, especially when it comes to fiscal penalties. Efforts to restrain this
creativity would also redirect it. In this respect, the importance of the Principles
lies not simply in the ways that it offers a meaningful path to more legal
protection for local authority. The Principles also hopefully offers an invitation
to a conversation about changing the politics of the preemption debate, centered
on the claim that local policy diversity might offer an escape out of endless
partisan rancor. The success of this project will depend on who accepts this
invitation to dialogue.

majority support for both ending the election audit in Texas and school masking requirements in
Arizona. See, e.g., Yana Kunichoff, Poll by Arizona Pro-Mask Groups Says Majority of Likely Voters Want
Masks in Schools, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
local/arizona-education/2021/09/09/arizona-pro-mask-groups-poll-majority-support-school-mask-man
dates/5772050001/ [https://perma.cc/8ECS-QRD2 (dark archive)]; Ross Ramsey, UT/TT Poll:
Majority of Texans Oppose Permitless Carry, Would Ban Police Chokeholds and Taxpayer-Funded Lobbying,
TEX. TRIB. (May 3, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/05/03/texas-voterslegislature-poll/ [https://perma.cc/SGC8-ELFZ] (discussing polls showing that seventeen percent of
Texans supported decreasing police funding and sixty-four percent of Texans wanted state oversight
of local decisions to reduce police funding).

